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Italian bicameralism is, in a comparative perspective, a unicum.
First of all, it is a so called “perfect bicameralism” in which the Chamber of Deputies
and the Senate carry out the same functions in the legislative process, so that, in
order to be approved, a legislative act has to be passed in an identical form by both
chambers.
Looking at this feature, one could say that nothing in the Italian bicameralism differs
from another form of perfect bicameralism: the American one. There too, in fact, the
two legislative branches share the same powers in the legislation making process.
But the Italian bicameralism is, so to speak, even more perfect. First of all, the
representation of the two chambers is exactly the same: they are elected by the
entire population of the nation (even if using different electoral systems and the
active and passive electorate is different, respectively 18-25 years and 25-40 years).
Therefore, the Senate does not represent sub-national/regional interests, as it does
in the United States or in Germany.
Moreover, the Senate is involved in the political circuit by being linked to the
executive branch, as in the case of the lower chamber, through the instrument of
the vote of confidence. The government has to resign if either the Senate or the
Chamber of Deputies refuses to grant it the vote of confidence. This provision also
seems quite strange in the comparative landscape.
The effectiveness and usefulness of such a system, introduced by the constituent
fathers in the Constitution of 1948, have been debated since soon after the entry
into force of the Italian constitution and the need for a reform has been a sort
of refrain that has marked the evolution of the Italian legal system. Among the
different attempts at reform, we can recall the D’Alema Committee proposal in 1997,
the Center-Right Reform in 2005, the Violante Draft in 2007 and the Proposal of
the Commission for Constitutional Reform, a technical commission appointed by
President Napolitano, in June 2013.
All of these attempts at reforming the Italian Senate, none of which succeeded,
were aimed at solving the inefficiencies of the system and transforming the Second
chamber into a “federal”, or at least real regional, one.
Among the inefficiencies, we must mention, first, the length of the legislative process.
The fact that each legislative act has to be passed by the two chambers in an
identical form has led to a slowing of the legislative process. Theoretically, the
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“navette” between one chamber and the other could last ad infinitum in the case of
disagreement on a legislative provision.
Though for some scholars the issue of the length of the legislative process is not
necessarily a negative one, since a longer process leads to more reflection on a
legislative act, the lack of mechanisms aimed at resolving the disagreement between
the two chambers, as exists with the German conciliation committee, for example,
produces an excessive slowing of the legislative making process.
Moreover, in the last legislatures (also, among other reasons, as a reaction to the
length of the ordinary legislative process), most of the legislation has been passed
in the form of law decrees (acts proposed by the Government which need to be
converted into law within 60 days by both chambers). Looking at the data referred
to the 16th legislature (2008-2013), we can see that the conversion of law decrees
is made substantially by one of the two chambers, while the other just ratifies
the decision of the first one. In other words, in many cases (80 % of the laws of
conversion) the Italian bicameralism works as a de facto unicameralism), in which
the second chamber simply gives its formal ratification to the decisions of the first
chamber.
Besides the legislative process, Italy’s second chamber has also been criticized
for the lack of representation of local autonomies. This is extremely important.
Looking at the design of the Constitution, one can find a broader recognition of
the regional principle, for example in Art. 5, and even more after the constitutional
reform of 2001 on the legislative competences between State and the Regions
(art. 117). The Italian bicameralism does not reflect the constitutional status of the
regions in Italy. Moreover, the regions, which have legislative power alongside
the central government, do not have a permanent forum (except the weak form
of representation into the so-called State-regions Conference) where they are
represented and where they can negotiate with the central government.
Not having a strong institutional place in which regional interests can be represented,
the Italian system is also characterized by a high rate of conflict between the state
and the regions, the arbiter of which is the Constitutional Court. In the light of
this aspect, one of the reasons in favor of the reform of bicameralism lies in the
possibility of reducing this overwhelming rate of justiciable contrasts.
Last but not least, the double vote of confidence links the government to both
chambers, making its existence more unstable.
Since this bicameralism is a cause of inefficiency, the reform of the Italian
Senate has to be at the center of Prime Minister Renzi’s agenda, which includes
constitutional interventions in order to modernize the state. On April 8, 2014, Renzi
proposed a new legislative draft (n. 1429), entitled “Provisions for exceeding the
equal bicameralism, reducing the number of parliamentary members, containing
the costs of institutions, abolishing the CNEL and revising Title V of Part II of the
Constitution.”
- 2 -
This draft, as it is a constitutional amendment, must be passed twice by each
chamber according to art. 138 of the Italian Constitution. Until now it has been
approved (with modifications) once by the Senate and it is under discussion in the
Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies.
The text approved by the Senate on August 8th is quite different from Renzi’s
proposal. Regarding membership, in the latter, in fact, the Senate would be
composed partially of the Presidents of Regions and the mayors of the regional
seats, and partially by 2 members of each Region elected by the Regional Council
from amongst their components and by 2 mayors elected by a board made up of all
the mayors of the Region. Moreover, 21 citizens who have honoured the country with
their merit in the social, scientific, artistic, and literary fields can be appointed by the
President of the Republic.
This proposal was then modified after the Senate’s debate. The current model
provides for 100 senators, 5 of which would be appointed by the President of
Republic, 74 elected by the Regional council among its members according a
proportional system and 21 by the mayors of the municipalities of the region. The
determination of the number of Senators reflects the population of each region and
not an equal representation as in Renzi’s proposal.
If the common ground of the two proposals is the will to overcome the perfect
bicameralism and move towards the transformation of the Second chamber into a
real regional chamber, the solutions are significantly different. The draft approved by
the Senate defines a stronger regional identity of the Senate than the government’s
proposal (having reduced the non-regional representation of the 21 members
appointed by the President), but on other hand, it adopts the distance of the
Bundesrat model, since the Presidents of the Regions, who hold the executive and
most prominent power within the regions, have been excluded from membership in
the Upper chamber.
Also, regarding the powers of the Senate, the clear scope of the bill is that of
breaking the perfect bicameralism. First of all, the bill provides that the relation of
confidence binds only the Chamber of Deputies to the government, while the Senate
is excluded from this relationship.
Moreover, the role of the Senate would be reduced in the legislative process as well.
Only a few types of laws would have to be approved also by the Senate, among
those we can mention the constitutional bills, constitutional amendments, laws
regarding local interests (art. 117 c. 2 letter p, and art. 122), referendums, and the
protection of linguistic minorities.
The Senate may propose amendments on other kinds of bills, but the Chamber of
Deputies has the last of word on approval. In a few cases (namely when the bill
concerns local interests or budget law) the dissent of the Senate can be passed over
only if the Chamber of Deputies re-approves the bill by an absolute majority.
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The draft here briefly described has been approved by the Senate and now has to be
approved twice by the chamber of deputies and once more by the Senate in identical
form, according to the reinforcement procedure of art. 138.
The parliamentary debate is, therefore, still at its first stage. Moreover, the
examination of the draft by the Constitutional commission of the Chamber started in
early September in a very cautious way. This is not surprising, since the destiny of
the Italian bicameralism and the resolution of the Italian oxymoron lies on the thin
line of the agreement between the main political forces, which seems quite frail and
uncertain at the moment.
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